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Virtually all companies today pursue innovation in order to
remain competitive. The question facing corporate decision makers is not whether to innovate, but rather which projects to pursue.
Conventional wisdom suggests high-risk projects provide the highest returns. We explore this notion with attention to the patent
output from a cross-sectional sample of U.S. corporate innovation
projects. Project risk is assessed upon project proposal using a
managerial perspective. The manager viewpoint is an important
one since managers are distinct in their approach to assessing risk,
as we expound, and are often the initial filtering point for project
proposals. Patent counts are measured 3 to 5 years later as an
indicator of project returns. We find that a “swing-for-the-fences”
strategy is effective, but not the sole best path to patent output.
Findings inform research on managerial risk construal and provide a fundamental basis for evaluation of potential innovation
projects. Organization Management Journal, 12: 200–207, 2015.
doi: 10.1080/15416518.2015.1081553
Keywords corporate innovation; managerial decision making; patent
output; risk and return

Investment in research and development within the United
States has grown at a staggering and largely uninterrupted
pace since 1953 (National Science Foundation National Center
for Science and Engineering Statistics, 2012). This growth is
largely attributable to the business sector, as virtually all companies today pursue innovation in order to remain competitive.
At the same time, the days of initiating corporate research and
development based on mere intellectual curiosity are long gone.
Even Google has whittled away at its “20-percent-time” program that encouraged employee experimentation on projects of
their own choosing. Return on investment is instead of utmost
concern. Sophisticated portfolio approaches and analyses of
Address correspondence to Kimberly K. Merriman, Manning
School of Business, University of Massachusetts Lowell, One
University Ave., Lowell, MA 01854, USA. E-mail: kimberly_
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strategic fit abound as industry and academia continuously
explore ways to enhance investment decision making in this
area. Yet the basic relation between singular project risk and
return remains a fundamental and, we contend, underappreciated consideration.
Conventional wisdom suggests high-risk projects provide the
greatest return. For instance, Rich Barton, the co-founder of
Zillow and Expedia, gave the following advice in addressing
technology developers:
Look, you have an at bat, and it takes just as much energy to
swing for the fences as it does to bunt. OK. So, why bunt? Why
bunt? Why not swing for the fences? I would argue that it is just
as likely that you will succeed if you swing for the fences as if you
bunt, and the outcome will be much more magical. And, I have to
say, being a part of something that you are swinging for the fences
and you are trying to change the world, is an excitement that you just
don’t get from bunting. (Cook, 2011)

To abide by this strategy, companies and their managers,
along with outside investors and government funding programs,
would favor high-risk projects with potential for high returns
when choosing among ways to support corporate innovation
(Rothaermel, 2008, p. 220). We empirically explore the practical usefulness of this tenet in the pages that follow by modeling
a “managerial” perspective of initial project risk as a predictor of subsequent patent output. We contend that the manager’s
view of project risk is a particularly important one since they are
often the filtering point for employee proposals and the gateway
for which ideas are considered at the organization’s executive
level (Reitzig, 2011). For instance, a cross-sector survey of large
companies throughout the United States, United Kingdom, and
France indicates that 87% of these firms use managers to facilitate corporate innovation (Koetzier & Alon, 2013). Further,
patent count is considered a pertinent measure of project returns
since it is recognized as an important innovation outcome and an
indicator of corporate knowledge creation, invention, and firm
innovativeness (Bertoni & Tykvovà, 2015; Wadhwa & Kotha,
2006; Wanga & Hagedoorn, 2014).
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In short, this study employs a cross-sectional sample of
corporate innovation projects to examine a managerial and
project-specific perspective on risk and return. Findings contribute to an understanding of the concepts of risk in managerial
decision making, a perspective of analysis that researchers have
argued is important but lacking in much of the organizational
research on risk and return (Nickel & Rodriguez, 2002; Ruefli,
Collins, & LaCugna, 1999). From a practical perspective, our
guiding question in this investigation reduces Cook’s baseball
analogy to a fundamental empirical question: What is most predictive of scoring hits (i.e., producing patents) when it comes
to choosing innovation projects—a low-probability swing-forthe-fences approach or a high-probability bunt approach? As
such, findings will inform managerial decision making and contribute to an evidence-based management approach to corporate
knowledge creation.
DEFINING THE MANAGERIAL RISK PERSPECTIVE
Existing research sheds light on antecedents of patent output
at the firm, industry, and country level (e.g., Ahuja & Katila,
2001; Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Somaya, Williamson, & Zhang,
2007), but such findings do not speak directly to the project
level of analysis where day-to-day managerial decision making
takes place. Yet this is often where the fate of potential corporate innovation projects are determined, one project at a time
as ideas and proposals vie for management support (Reitzig,
2011). Evaluation of project risk is at the crux of managerial
assessment during this stage.
At the firm level of analysis and beyond, risk has been
interpreted as variance in returns within most management literatures. However, construing risk as variance does not capture
the concepts of risk employed by managers who must assess and
oversee the risks of their decisions (Ruefli et al., 1999). This is
because a variance measure of risk does not involve any specific
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event that invokes decision making (see Nickel & Rodriguez,
2002). Variance in returns is assessed based on the aggregation of investment performance, well after decisions are made.
We are instead concerned here with the assessment of project
risk prior to project commencement, subsequently matched to
performance assessed at a future point in the project process.
March and Shapira (1987) reported the tendency of managers
to look at the volume of risk rather than variation of performance. In operationalization of the managerial risk perspective,
MacCrimmon and Wehrung deconstructed the definition of risk
to the magnitude of the payoff at stake and the chance of the
outcome occurring. These two dimensions of risk are evident in
the way innovation is often labeled in dichotomous terms associated with high and low risk. For instance, the basic baseball
terminology used by Cook to describe innovation—swing for
the fences or bunt—clearly encompasses the concepts of payoff magnitude and probability of success. See Table 1 for other
common labels associated with innovation that also inherently
use the managerial definition of risk. In assessing these two risk
characteristics within the present study, magnitude of the payoff
at stake is represented by projected future earnings of proposed
innovation projects, 10 years forward, and probability refers to
the perceived likelihood of project success.
OPPOSING VIEWS ON THE RISK–RETURN
RELATIONSHIP
Previous studies focusing on financial returns have yielded
two conflicting views regarding how risk may influence returns
(Miller & Bromiley, 1990). We first summarize these two views
and then discuss how they might inform predictions for the context under study—a managerial perspective of risk in relation to
patent output for innovation projects. The first broad view stems
from the economic literature and suggests a positive relationship between risk and return (Fisher & Hall, 1969). Under this

TABLE 1
Managerial definition of risk inherent in innovation labels
Two dimensions of risk inherent in innovation labels: payoff magnitude and probability of success
High magnitude, low probability

Low magnitude, high probability

Swinging for the fences
Major breakthroughs
Disruptive innovations
Exploration
Revolutionary
Creativity
Novelty
Radical change
Blue sky thinking
Basic research
Innovative

Bunting
Gradual improvement
Sustaining innovations
Exploitation
Evolutionary
Practicality
Familiarity
Incremental change
Grounded thinking
Applied research
Adaptive
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view, high-risk projects are assumed to provide more returns
because most organizations are risk averse and as such would
not take a high-risk decision unless the expected reward can
compensate the risk (Singh, 1986). Capital budgeting theory
also requires that there should be risk-induced discounts for the
future value of project returns. A high-risk project must provide
higher future net cash flows to have the same net present value
as a low-risk project (Bromiley, 1991).
Contradicting this broad view are Bowman’s (1980) empirical findings of a negative relationship between risk and return
using accounting data. Miller and Bromiley (1990) also found
that there is a negative association between income stream risk
and return. The explanations for these and similar findings are
mainly drawn from the causal perspective that low-performance
companies take more risk. However, the negative risk–return
relationship has also been explained from the causal direction
of risk preceding performance. The good management theory (Bowman, 1980) argues that managerial intervention to
reduce risk is associated with lower cost and better performance
(Andersen, Denrell, & Bettis, 2007). For example, having good
management associated with acquisition and merger activities
led to lack of surprise (risk) and increased profit (Bowman,
1980). In sum, extant literature presents conflicting accounts of
risk’s influence on financial performance as either positive or
negative.
We conjecture that the risk–return findings and theory that
pertain to financial returns translate in a less unitary way to predict patent output, in a way that distinctly recognizes both the
probability and magnitude characteristics of project risk. The
theory that good management can simultaneously reduce risk
and increase returns and the fundamental notion that greater
risk is undertaken only for higher returns both implicitly link
returns to occurring within the divergence between probability of success and the financial amount at stake. This is where
the potential for interfirm-performance differences and competitive advantage resides since it allows firms to differ in their
strategic decisions regarding which probability and corresponding financial stake to pursue, and to exploit their competencies
for influencing these components of risk (Rothaermel, 2008).
By extension, a lack of divergence between probability of
success and financial amount at stake, on the other hand, is
a constraint to interfirm-performance differences and potential
competitive advantage. This reasoning is best understood when
probability of success and financial amount at stake are both
low. The combination of risk factors provides little opportunity for performance advantage for any firm, and thus, in terms
of the present study context, little incentive to pursue patents
with projects that fall within this domain. A similar neutralizing
effect on interfirm performance can be envisioned when probability of success and amount at financial stake are both high.
This combination of risk factors provides a clear performance
choice for all firms, and thus a competitive advantage for none.
Likewise, innovation outcomes from projects that fall within
this domain arguably face a greater threat of imitation from

competitors. A more efficient way than patents for firms to maximize the financial value of innovation outcomes in this context
is to practice secrecy of inventions in order to gain market
lead time, and avoid seeking patents altogether or at least defer
patents until the commercialization stage (HanGyeol, Yanghon,
Dongphil, & Chungwon, 2015; Laursen & Salter, 2005).
In order to empirically consider this interactive perspective
of the two risk characteristics in predicting patent output, we
propose a guiding set of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a (b): There will be an interactive association
between an innovation project’s risk characteristics and its
subsequent patent output such that patent quantity will be
greater for projects high (low) in probability and low (high)
in magnitude relative to projects that are consistently high or
low on both risk dimensions.

METHODS
Sample
Our study employs a wide cross-sectional sample of U.S.
corporate innovation projects derived from proprietary information held by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Technology Innovation Program (NIST-TIP). NIST is a nonregulatory federal agency and its program’s mission was to
help for-profit organizations in their pursuit of development and
commercialization of innovations, thereby potentially providing broad-based benefits for the national economy. Data were
collected for 183 innovation projects that received a portion of
seed funding from the Technology Innovation Program (TIP)
from 2005 to 2007.
Under the terms and conditions of this agency’s funding
awards, decision makers from the firms proposing each project
were required to respond to multiple surveys. We use data from
two surveys: the Baseline Report that participants completed
upon the initial project proposal, and the Closeout Report that
was completed 3 to 5 years later. The timing of the two surveys
is an important aspect of the study. The Baseline Report provided an assessment of project risk before project commencement, in keeping with the conceptualization of managerial risk
in decision making as expounded herein. The Closeout Report
provided a measure of patent output subsequent that of project
risk assessment.
Measures
Managerial Risk
Following our managerial definition of risk, we measured
project risk based on the firm’s perceived probability of project
success and projected project revenue 10 years forward (labeled
potential “magnitude” of project payoff). Both items are from
the company decision maker’s perspective at the Baseline
point of survey. Consistent with our conceptualization and
hypotheses, we focus on the interactive relation between these
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two dimensions of risk rather than the main effect of either individual dimension. Therefore, the managerial risk scale is not
interpretable in linear terms. Instead, our conceptual development points to the intersections of low probability/high magnitude and high probability/low magnitude to predict higher
patent output for innovation projects within these areas of the
risk quadrant.
Project Performance (Patents)
Patent output is measured by the number of patents reported
at the Closeout period. This measure of performance is distinct
from a financial measure of project performance (e.g., product
revenue) in that it generally occurs within a shorter time frame,
and is less influenced by an organization’s preexisting market
dominance and environmental conditions (Pisano, 2010). It is
also notable that the measure is based on the Closeout survey,
representing a 3- to 5-year time lag between the independent
variable and dependent variable. While there is potential for
patents to continue to unfold beyond the Closeout period, we
suggest this 3- to 5-year window of time provides a reasonable reflection of project innovation since, as noted earlier,
patents generally occur within a shorter time frame than financial returns. Finally, it should also be noted that the funding
program held neither explicit nor implicit incentives for patent
output since funding was fully committed prior to patent output
and participants were permitted only one round of seed funding.
Control Variables
Finally, we included control variables to rule out alternative
explanations for the focal risk–return relationship. To control for firms’ performance before they apply for project seed
funding, we included return on assets (ROA) 1 year prior to
the application. Industry effects were controlled by dummy
variables. We considered five industry categories: electronics,
manufacturing, biotechnology, materials/chemicals, and information technology. To address the liability of company newness
(Freeman & Hannan, 1983), we control for whether a firm
considers itself a young, startup firm or not. We also control
for research and development (R&D) intensity (R&D expense
divided by revenue) and firm size (number of employees)
because different technological and human resources may influence a firm’s performance. Given that status as a publicly listed
company requires fairly successful operations and certification
of finances by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
we control for whether a firm is publicly or privately held.
In order to take into account the potential lessening of risk burden through the sharing of innovation project risk with other
firm partners, we control for whether the innovation project is
a joint venture. Lastly, we control for whether there was any
significant company change during the innovation project funding period, defined as a change in company top management
team, strategic direction, or ownership, or a company restructuring, merger/acquisition, financial difficulty/downsizing, or
any other significant events.
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Analytic Strategy
Our dependent variable is a count measure. Because our
dependent variable is a nonnegative integer with limited range,
we cannot use simple ordinary least squares (OLS). The
assumption of homoscedasticity and normally distributed errors
does not hold for our model. We therefore use a negative
binomial model. While Poisson models are also possible, we
use the negative binomial model because it does not assume
mean–variance equality.
RESULTS
Means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients are
reported in Table 2. The descriptive statistics showed that there
is no systematic bias in the direction or magnitude of the
variables. To test for the presence of multicollinearity, we examined the variance inflation factors (VIFs) and none of them
are more than 10, which is the commonly accepted threshold
(Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). We therefore retain all
variables.
Table 3 summarizes the results of the negative binomial
model analysis. Model 1 introduces the control variables and
model 2 tests the relationship between risk and project performance. Overall, the models are robust. The log-likelihood of
the fitted model shows that all predictors included show clear
difference from the nested model. In particular, the likelihoodratio test of alpha shows that the dispersion of parameter alpha is
183.58 with an associated p value of .001. The large test statistic
suggests that our dependent variable of patents is overdispersed
and is not sufficiently described by the simple Poisson distribution. We also additionally ran a Poisson regression and found
that the results are substantively the same.
We had speculated there would be an interactive association
between an innovation project’s risk characteristics and its subsequent patent output such that patent count would be greater
for projects high (low) in probability and low (high) in magnitude relative to projects that are consistently high or low on
each risk dimension. We found the coefficient for the interaction of the two risk characteristics of interest to be negative and
significant (β = –.003; p < .05), a first step in confirming our
proposed relationships.
To evaluate the direction of the relationship and better understand the complex nature of disaggregated dimensions of risk,
we graphed a three-dimensional perspective of the interaction
(see Figure 1). Figure 1 Our results are consistent with the
posited relationships, indicating that the highest patent output is associated with innovation projects at the intersections
of low probability/high magnitude and high probability/low
magnitude within the risk quadrant. Consistent with our earlier
conceptual reasoning, it seems a low/high and high/low divergence between probability of success and projected magnitude
of financial returns allows firms to exploit their competencies in
strategic pursuit of patent output, whereas a lack of divergence
between probability of success and projected magnitude of
financial returns constrains these strategic benefits.
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5.03
23.75
11.57
42.72
2.32
2.37
.11
.44
.44
.50

SD
−.08
.12
.01
.00
.16∗
.02
.10
..09
−.08

1

−.05
−.09
.02
−.04
−.12
−.11
.09
.07

2

.01
.17∗
.27∗
−.05
.05
−.48∗
−.07

3

−.01
.07
.01
−.03
.02
−.04

4

−.20∗
−.12
−.01
−.28∗
.28∗

5

.68∗
.09
.48∗
−.52∗

6

.16∗
.21∗
−..36∗

7

−.13
.07

8

−.52∗

9

Note. N = 183. ∗ p < .05. Industry dummies omitted. Performance = patent quantity; magnitude = projected project revenue 10 years forward, reported in millions.
Dummy coding: public company 0 = no, 1 = yes; significant changes 0 = yes, 1 = no; joint venture 0 = no, 1 = yes; startup 0 = no, 1 = yes.

1.77
63.25
2.33
−2.25
1.19
3.74
.01
.74
.25
.50

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Performance
Probability
Magnitude
Return of asset
R&D intensity
Firm size (logarithm)
Public company
Significant changes
Joint venture
Startup

Mean

Variable

TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics and correlations
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TABLE 3
Results of negative binomial model
Variables
Return on asset
R&D intensity
Firm size
Public company
Significant changes
Joint venture
Startup
Industry M
Industry I
Industry A
Industry E
Probability
Magnitude
Risk
Alpha
Log-likelihood
Wald
Pseudo R2

Model 1

Model 2

0.001 (0.009)
0.107 (0.111)
0.325 (0.109)∗∗
−18.42 (2187.2)
−0.490 (0.457)
0.603 (0.558)
0.624 (0.492)
0.777 (0.700)
−0.286 (0.582)
−0.546 (0.725)
−0.078 (0.577)
−0.009 (0.008)
−0.015 (0.341)

0.001 (0.008)
0.137 (0.120)
.0.303 (0.107)∗∗
−17.73 (1986.1)
−0.451 (0.455)
0.577 (0.537)
0.669 (0.479)
0.474 (0.700)
−0.329 (0.574)
−0.831 (0.725)
−0.255 (0.574)
−0.002 (0.008)
0.001 (0.331)
−0.003 (0.669)∗
0.724∗∗∗
−159.24529
28.05∗
0.0822

2.244∗∗∗
−161.35575
24.31∗
0.0701

Note. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p < .001, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗ p < .05. Industry dummies:
M = manufacturing, I = information technology, A = materials/chemicals, E = electronics, B = biotechnology (reference category).

1.00

Return

0.95
0.90
0.85
4
2

4
0

2

Probability

0

–2
–2
–4

Magnitude

–4

FIG. 1. Patent returns in relation to risk magnitude and probability.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Risk is an essential element of strategic management practice and research. However, much of this research—particularly
in the area of corporate innovation and patent output—has
relied on measures borrowed from other disciplines. Strategy
scholars have argued that our continued reliance on adopted
measures is a key factor in delaying the pragmatic maturation
of strategy research (see Bettis, 1991; Daft & Buenger, 1990;
Ruefli et al., 1999). It has been strongly suggested that “strategy
researchers now confront a fundamental methodological change

rooted in this early borrowing of methods” (Ruefli et al., 1999:
167). Accordingly, we applied a measure of risk derived from
a managerial perspective—a two-dimensional measure of risk
that encompasses both probability and potential magnitude of
project success. We emphasize this as an informative approach
for analysis at the project level, as compared to the typical measure of risk as variance that is applied at the firm level and
beyond. Using this measure, innovation projects were analyzed
based on their initial risk ratings and subsequent patent output.
Our empirical results demonstrated a significant interactive
relationship between the risk characteristics of probability of
success and magnitude of potential payout, as perceived at
project start, in predicting patent output upon project completion 3 to 5 years later. As Figure 1 shows, patent output
was highest for projects in which high probability was combined with the potential for a low-magnitude payout and when
low probability was combined with the potential for a highmagnitude payout. Thus, it would seem that a swing-for-thefences approach is indeed one way to succeed in knowledge
creation, but not the sole best way.
In keeping with the opening baseball analogy, a more
nuanced comparison between baseball and R&D risk is fitting
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). A player can contribute to his team
with either a big hit (e.g., home-run) or small but safe hits (e.g.,
bunts). Hamel and Prahalad conjectured that successful hits tend
to come from someone who specializes in one or the other.
In innovation terms, there are firms that pursue a breakthrough
innovation that can change the landscape of current competitive
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dynamics. On the other hand, there are firms that make safe bets
with an increased probability of success but small impact. Our
findings support the efficacy of both strategies for quantity of
patent output in relation to innovation projects.
Of equal interest are the project risk characteristics that
resulted in lower patent output. Projects that are comparably
low or high in both probability of success and magnitude of
projected financial return had a relatively lower quantity of
patent output than the projects already described. We reason
that a lack of divergence between probability and magnitude
of payout constrains the potential to gain competitive advantage through pursuit of patents. Conceptually, projects with a
low probability and low magnitude of payout offer little incentive to pursue patents. Projects with a high probability and
high magnitude of payout hold obvious potential for attractive
financial returns, yet it is for this very reason that innovation
outcomes from projects within this domain may face a greater
threat of imitation from competitors. Disclosure of inventions through patents may exacerbate the threat of imitation.
Therefore, strategic management of innovation outcomes in this
context would call for keeping inventions secret as long as possible in order to gain market lead time (HanGyeol et al., 2015;
Laursen & Salter, 2005). Our findings are consistent with this
notion of manager or firm behavior, and would suggest projects
with these risk characteristics are poor choices for government funding programs aimed at generating external knowledge
spillover.
The preceding point, that firms may choose secrecy over
patents as a way to maximize the financial return of innovation
outcomes, highlights that our outcome measure, patent count,
is only one outcome of interest when examining innovation
projects. Patent count captures the quantity of patent output and
has been used to represent invention and innovation across a
variety of studies (e.g., Acs, Anselin, & Varga, 2002; Bertoni
& Tykvová, 2015; Wadhwa & Kotha, 2006). However, it does
not speak to the quality of patent output. In baseball terminology, we have simply captured the number of hits, not the
value of each hit. However, our risk dimensions, probability
and magnitude of payout, do indicate which projects have the
characteristics of a home run (low probability, high magnitude
potential) or bunt (high probability, low magnitude potential)
at project commencement. Intuitively, it seems that these initial project characteristics should also influence the quality of
patent output. Future research can extend the predictive value
of the present framework by empirically examining this intuition, that is, by considering whether the managerial perspective
on project risk also predicts actual patent quality (e.g., citation
rates) in addition to patent quantity.
Although this study has many advantages, its limitations
must also be noted. First, though the sample represented a
wide cross section of industries and project type, we cannot
necessarily generalize our findings to all corporate innovation
contexts. Second, as discussed more fully in the preceding, due
to the confidentiality of our sample and the longer realization

period for quality-related returns, we were not able to consider patent quality as a potential additional outcome of interest.
Thus, our results speak only to patent quantity. Third, our
measure of project risk could be subject to respondent bias
toward exaggeration of risk, though systematic exaggeration
of risk across the projects would not unduly influence findings for interaction effects on relative outcomes, as investigated
herein, as opposed to main effects and absolute relationships.
Notwithstanding these points, we believe that the richness of
the data in managerial insight, ex ante risk assessment, and
situation-specific results contributes much value.
In sum, using a unique data set, we were able to directly
assess risk perceptions for innovation projects at the project
proposal stage and relate them to subsequent performance in
the important area of project patent output. The study’s focal
risk characteristics represent a managerial and project-specific
perspective on innovation risk, as opposed to the accounting and finance measure typically applied by researchers and
analysts, in which risk is expressed as the variance of some
broad measure of financial returns. This managerial risk perspective reflects how project risk is assessed in day-to-day
practice when choosing to support certain innovation projects
over others. As such, the findings more closely inform actual
decision making and contribute to an evidence-based management approach to strategic filtering of research and development
projects.
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